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Abstract 
In economically developed countries, aging societies with fewer children are 
progressing. Increased longevity has necessitated postponement of the working 
retirement age. Our paper presents an examination of how subsidies for an elderly 
labor supply affect the elderly labor supply. Our paper presents derivation that this 
subsidy raises the elderly labor supply. Then, the wage rate of younger laborers can be 
increased because of complementarity between the younger labor supply and older 
labor supply. This effect is explained as an externality. By virtue of the externality 
effect, a subsidy to facilitate the elderly labor supply should be provided in support of 
social welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
A low birthrate and an aging society are progressing rapidly in Japan. The ratio of 
older people to the total population in 2016 has reached 27%.1 Japan and other 
economically developed countries are suffering from the effects of the aging situation. 
An aging society with fewer children presents several problems, one of which is the 
social security system. Social security benefits such as pensions and medical care are 
supported mainly by payments made by younger people. The total fertility rate in 2015 
was 1.46.2 Although the total fertility rate has been increasing in recent years, a rate 
of 2.07 must be maintained to keep the population size in Japan. It goes without saying 
that the population size in Japan is decreasing. 
The government in Japan cut pension benefits as a pension reform measure. 
Concretely, the start age of pension benefits was raised to 65 years. Some OECD 
countries such as Germany and the U.S.A. have increased the starting age of pension 
benefits because the government is concerned about pension funding shortages. 
From Fig. 1, which presents the employment rate of older workers of population aged 
55–64, it is apparent that the older people actively supply labor in many OECD 
countries. Especially, 55–64 aged people in Japan work actively. The labor 
participation rate of older people older than 65 years is about 20%.3 
 
[Insert Fig. 1 around here.] 
 
The government of Japan facilitates an elderly labor supply. The law “Concerning 
Stabilization of Employment of elderly” demands an increase of the retirement age, 
the abolition of mandatory retirement, and continued employment for firms. Moreover, 
based on the employment insurance act in Japan, the elderly labor supply is provided 
a subsidy if the wage rate of elderly labor is less than a certain level. The government 
promotes an increase in the elderly labor supply with these acts. 
                                                  
1Data: Statistics Japan. 
2Data: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan. 
3Data: OECD Statistics. 
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Our paper presents an examination showing that the subsidy for an elderly labor 
supply affects the elderly labor supply. A model is set in which final goods are produced 
by inputting capital stock and labor provided by younger people and older people. Our 
paper presents a derivation demonstrating that this subsidy increases the elderly labor 
supply. Then, the wage rate of younger labor supply can be raised because of 
complementarity between the younger labor supply and older labor supply. This effect 
is explained as an externality. By virtue of the externality effect, a subsidy to facilitate 
the elderly labor supply is expected to be provided for social welfare. 
Some analyses have specifically addressed the elderly labor supply. Feldstein (1977) 
and Hu (1979) set the endogenous retirement and examine a partial equilibrium model. 
Hu (1979) examines how public pensions affect the retirement age. Matsuyama (2008) 
sets an Overlapping Generations Model (OLG) and examines a retirement decision. 
Matsuyama (2008) shows that an increase in savings hastens the retirement age 
because an increase in savings will engender an increase in capital, which increases 
the next generation’s wage income and income growth. Aísa, Pueyo and Sanso (2012) 
derive that an increase in longevity raises the participation rate of labor supply by 
older people. Kangasharju (2007) examines empirically that the subsidy for elderly 
labor can raise the labor supply of older people. For instance, the subsidy policy is more 
efficient than a policy of direct income transfer to older people, as demonstrated 
through empirical research by Acs and Toder (2007). 
If the retirement age is late and older people can obtain sufficient income to live, 
financial resources of a pay-as-you-go pension are affordable because the government 
can cut the pension benefit. Butrica, Smith, and Steuerle (2006) demonstrate that 
retirement age extension has a positive effect on incomes and pensions. However, 
Lachance (2007) derives a negative correlation between retirement age and social 
welfare. Mizuno and Yakita (2013) consider heterogeneity among individuals and 
derive that the timing of retirement affects the total fertility rate. Cocco and Gomes 
(2012) study longevity risk effects on individual saving and retirement decisions. 
Christian, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2010) examine the impact for retirement 
behavior of policy such as lengthening the calculation period and moving from wage to 
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price indexation of benefits in pension system. Echevarria and Iza (2006) elucidate the 
relation between life expectancy and the growth rate of income per capita. Higher life 
expectancy lowers per capita GDP growth because the share of the active population 
decreases and the burden for social security increases. 
Is the elderly labor supply substitutive for a supply of young laborers? As 
demonstrated by Ohta (2007), this is either substitutive or complementary. However, 
substitution is observed in the construction industry. In addition, the substitution is 
observed in a part time job, too, which does not mean that the substitution is generally 
observed in all industries and all work. OECD average data show that both young labor 
participation and old labor participation increase together. 4  These results show 
partial complementarity between young and old workers. 
Some reasons can explain the complementarity. For example, intergenerational skill 
inheritance by young workers from old workers raises the productivity of young 
workers. In the field of human capital theory, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), who 
conducted fundamental studies related to human capital, considers that human capital 
as labor productivity depends not only on educational investment but also on the level 
of human capital of the prior generation. Therefore, complementarity between young 
and old workers can be considered. Our paper presents consideration of 
complementarity between young and old workers and derives how the subsidy for 
elderly labor affects the labor force participation of older people. 
The remainder of this paper includes the following. Section 2 sets the model and 
derives the equilibrium in section 3. Section 4 presents an examination of how the 
policy affects the elderly labor supply. The optimal subsidy policy to maximize social 
welfare is derived as explained in section 5. The final section concludes the research 
described in this paper. 
 
2. The Model 
                                                  
4Data: OECD Data “Labour force participation rate.” In the OECD average, the labor participation 
of 25–54 years is 80.5% in 2001, which rises to 81.59% in 2015. The labor participation of 55–64 
years is 50.45% in 2001, which rises to 61.08% in 2015. 
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This model economy has agents of three types: households, firms, and government. 
The individuals of households live in two periods: a young period and old period. Our 
paper presents consideration of an overlapping generations model. Then the younger 
people and older people coexist in any t period. 
 
2.1 Household 
Households derive utility from consumption in young and old periods and leisure in 
the old period. Our paper assumes the following log utility function ݑ௧, shown as 
ݑ௧ ൌ ߙ݈݊ܿଵ௧ ൅ ߚ݈݊ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ݈݈݊௧ାଵ,0 ൏ ߙ, 0 ൏ ߚ, ߙ ൅ ߚ ൏ 1, (1)
where ܿଵ௧ and ܿଶ௧ାଵ respectively denote consumption in the young period and in the 
old period. Also, ݈௧ାଵdenotes leisure time in the old period. 
Households in the young period provide the labor supply inelastically to obtain a 
wage. The younger people must pay a tax and allocate disposable income to 
consumption in the young period and saving to consume in the old period. Then, the 
budget constraint in the young period is shown as 
ܿଵ௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓଵ௧ െ ௧ܶ, (2)
where ݏ௧ denotes savings. ݓଵ௧ represents the wage rate of younger people. τ and T 
respectively stand for the income tax rate and lump-sum taxation. A lump-sum tax is 
used to finance the employment policy for older people. We assume 0 ൏ ߬ ൏ 1 and 0 ൏
௧ܶ. 
In the old period, the older people have a unit of time and enjoy leisure time and 
provide a labor supply. If the older people enjoy leisure time ݈௧ାଵ, then the older people 
provides labor time 1 െ ݈௧ାଵ.5 The government levies the income tax for older people 
to finance pension benefits. However, the government provides a subsidy for the labor 
supply of older people to facilitate the labor supply. Older people can obtain the labor 
income, capital income, and pension benefits. These incomes are consumed during the 
old period. No bequest occurs, by assumption. Then, the budget constraint during the 
old period is shown as 
                                                  
5We consider the labor time 1 െ ݈௧ାଵ as retirement timing. If the labor time 1 െ ݈௧ାଵ is small, then 
we consider that retirement year old is earlier. 
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In that equation, 1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵdenotes the interest rate. ε and σ respectively denote the 
income tax rate for older people and the subsidy rate for the labor supply of older people. 
ݓଶ௧ାଵ  denotes the wage rate of older people. ݌௧ାଵ  stands for the pension benefit. 
Income tax rate ε is levied to finance pension benefits. The pension system has aspects 
of inter-generation and intra-generation income redistribution.6 
Considering (2) and (3), the lifetime budget constraint is obtainable as 
ܿଵ௧ ൅ ܿଶ௧ାଵ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓଵ௧ െ ௧ܶ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓଶ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ
1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵ ൅
݌௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵ. (4)
The household’s optimal allocations to maximize the utility function (1) subject to 
the budget constraint (4) are derived as 
ܿଵ௧ ൌ ߙܫ, (5)
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܫ, (6)
݈௧ାଵ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ
ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓଶ௧ାଵ ܫ, (7)
where I ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓଵ௧ െ ௧ܶ ൅ ሺଵିఌሻሺଵାఙሻ௪మ೟శభଵା௥೟శభ ൅
௣೟శభ
ଵା௥೟శభ. 
 
2.2 Firm 
The firm produces the final goods by inputting capital stock and labor. The production 
function is assumed as7 
௧ܻ ൌ ܭ௧ఏ൫ߛܮ௧ఘ ൅ ߜܮ௧ିଵఘ ൯
ଵିఏ
ఘ , 0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 1, ߩ ൏ 1. (8)
Therein, ௧ܻ stands for the output of final goods. ܭ௧ denotes the capital stock. ܮ௧ and 
ܮ௧ିଵ respectively represent the labor input of younger people and that of older people. 
                                                  
6In Japan, older workers younger than seventy years old must pay premiums for a pension as the 
rule of public pensions. 
7With ρ ൌ 1, we obtain the production function ௧ܻ ൌ ܭ௧ఏሺߛܮ௧ ൅ ߜܮ௧ିଵሻଵିఏ . This production function is 
considered as a perfectly substitutive form. Then, the wage rates of young workers and old workers 
are constant in a small open economy. With ρ ൌ 0 , we obtain the product function ௧ܻ ൌ
ܭ௧ఏܮ௧ఊሺଵିఏሻܮ௧ିଵሺଵିఊሻሺଵିఏሻ. Then, the wage rates of young workers and old workers depend on the labor 
supply of older people and the population growth rate, as shown by (11) and (12). Our paper presents 
consideration of different cases including a substitutive case ሺ0 ൏ ߩ ൏ 1ሻ and a complementary case 
ሺെ∞ ൏ ߩ ൏ 0ሻ, except for perfect substitution and perfect complementarity. 
 
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻݏ௧ ൅ ݌௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓଶ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ. (3)
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This production function, which is formed as a Cobb–Douglas function between ܭ௧ 
and൫ߛܮ௧ఘ ൅ ߜܮ௧ିଵఘ ൯
భ
ഐ, is formed as a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function 
between ܮ௧  and ܮ௧ିଵ. Our paper presents consideration of the substitution level of 
younger laborers and older laborers to examine details of how the labor demand for 
older people affects the demand for younger people. Setting profit function ߨ௧ as ߨ௧ ൌ
௧ܻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ሻܭ௧ െ ݓଵ௧ܮ௧ െ ݓଶ௧ܮ௧ିଵ  and assuming perfect competition and full capital 
stock depreciation in a period, profit maximization for capital stock ܭ௧ produces the 
following equation. 
1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵ ൌ ߠ݇௧ఏିଵ  (9)
In that equation, the following variable is used. 
݇௧ ൌ ܭ௧
൫ߛܮ௧ఘ ൅ ߜܮ௧ିଵఘ ൯
ଵ
ఘ
 (10)
Profit maximization of the labor input of younger people ܮ௧ derives the following 
equation. 
ݓଵ௧ ൌ ߛሺ1 െ ߠሻ݇௧ఏ ቆߛ ൅ ߜ ൬1 െ ݈௧݊ ൰
ఘ
ቇ
ଵ
ఘିଵ
 (11)
In that equation, n signifies the gross population growth rate. Assuming ௧ܰ and ௧ܰିଵ 
as population size of young generation and old generation, respectively, the gross 
population growth rate is n ൌ ே೟ே೟షభ . 8  The labor input of older people changes the 
marginal productivity of the labor of younger people and wage rate ݓଵ௧ . Profit 
maximization of the labor input of older people ܮ௧ିଵ derives the following equation. 
ݓଶ௧ ൌ ߜሺ1 െ ߠሻ݇௧ఏ ൬ߛ ൬ ݊1 െ ݈௧൰
ఘ
൅ ߜ൰
ଵ
ఘିଵ
 (12) 
An increase in the population of younger people or a decrease in labor input of older 
people raises the marginal productivity of labor of older people and wage rate ݓଶ௧. 
Considering (11) and (12), the wage rate ratio is derived as 
௪భ೟
௪మ೟ ൌ
ఊ
ఋ ቀ
ଵି௟೟
௡ ቁ
ଵିఘ
. (13) 
                                                  
8Then, we obtain ܮ௧ ൌ ௧ܰ because younger people provide labor inelastically. However, older people 
provide 1 െ ݈௧ of labor time. We obtain ܮ௧ିଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ ௧ܰିଵ. 
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An increase in the population growth rate reduces the wage ratio ௪భ೟௪మ೟ because of an 
increase in labor supply by younger people. 
 
2.3. Government 
The government provides a subsidy for the labor supply by older people and a 
pension benefit for older people. The subsidy for the labor supply by older people is 
financed by lump-sum tax ௧ܶ  from younger people. With a balanced budget, the 
following equation is obtained. 
௧ܶ ൌ σݓଶ௧
ሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ
݊ . (14) 
Therein, ௧ܶ is determined to hold the balanced budget (14). 
The government provides the pension benefit for older people, which is financed by 
labor income taxation for younger and older people. This pension system is partially a 
pay-as-you-go pension because the revenue from younger people is given to older 
people. However, this pension is financed by older people, too: this pension system 
includes intergenerational and intra-generational income transfer. With a balanced 
budget, the following equation is obtained. 
p୲ ൌ nτwଵ୲ ൅ εݓଶ௧ (15) 
 
3. Equilibrium 
This section presents derivation of the equilibrium of the model economy. For these 
analyses, we assume a small open economy. Then, the interest rate is given by the fixed 
world interest rate. Considering (9), the capital-effective labor ratio ݇௧ given by (10) 
is fixed, too. ݓଵ௧ and ݓଶ௧ depend on ݈௧. 
Considering (7) and (15), leisure time ݈௧ାଵ is shown as 
l୲ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓଶ௧ାଵ ൭ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓଵ௧ െ ௧ܶ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓଶ௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ ൅
݊߬ݓଵ௧ାଵ ൅ ߝݓଶ௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ ൱, (16)
where ௧ܶ  is given by (14). Therefore, given ݈௧ିଵ , we obtain ݈௧  and the wage rate 
ݓଵ௧, ݓଶ௧ are obtained, too. The equilibrium is specified by the dynamic equation of ݈௧ 
(16). 
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We consider the steady state equilibrium with l୲ାଵ ൌ l୲ ൌ l. Now, we assume the 
steady state with T ൌ σ ൌ 0. Then, considering (11)–(13) and (16), the leisure time at 
steady state l is given to satisfy the following equation. 
ሺ1 െ ߝሻl ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ ߛߜ ൬
1 െ ݈
݊ ൰
ଵିఘ
ቆ1 ൅ ݊ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ1 ൅ ݎ ߬ቇ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ (17) 
Defining ܮ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߝሻl  and ܴ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ ఊఋ ቀ
ଵି௟
௡ ቁ
ଵିఘ ቀ1 ൅ ௡ିሺଵା௥ሻଵା௥ ߬ቁ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ െ
ߚሻ, we can obtain the unique steady state because there exists an intersect, as shown 
in Fig. 2.9 
 
[Insert Fig. 2 around here.] 
 
We obtain ௗ௟೟శభௗ௟೟  as shown below. 
݈݀௧ାଵ
݈݀௧ ൌ െ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻߛሺ1 െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ቀ ݊1 െ ݈ቁ
ଵିଶఘ
ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ൬ߛ ൅ ߜ ቀ1 െ ݈݊ ቁ
ఘ
൰
1 ൅ ߛሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻሺ1 െ ߩሻߜሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ቌ
ߛሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ቀ ݊1 െ ݈ቁ
ଵାఘ
ߛ ൅ ߜ ቀ1 െ ݈݊ ቁ
ఘ ൅ ݊߬1 ൅ ݎ ቀ
1 െ ݈
݊ ቁ
ଵିఘ
ቍ
. (18) 
If ቚௗ௟೟శభௗ௟೟ ቚ ൏ 1, then the steady state equilibrium is stable. 
 
4. Policy and labor supply by older people 
This section presents a description of how the subsidy for labor supplied by older people 
affects the wage and labor supply of older people. 
 
Subsidy for elderly labor supply 
First, we examine whether the subsidy for elderly labor supply raises the elderly labor 
supply or not. For simplicity, we consider the model economy without pension benefit, 
that is, τ ൌ ε ൌ 0. Then, the following equation is obtained. The leisure time is given 
to satisfy this equation. 
                                                  
9We assume ε ൏ 1 െ ߙ െ ߚ to have the intersect of R and L. 
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l ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ ቆ 11 ൅ ߪ
ߛ
ߜ ൬
1 െ ݈
݊ ൰
ଵିఘ
െ 1݊
ߪ
1 ൅ ߪ ሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ൅
1
1 ൅ ݎቇ (19) 
Total differentiation by l and σ yields ௗ௟ௗఙ, shown as 
݈݀
݀ߪ ൌ െ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻଶ ቆ
ߛ
ߜ ቀ
1 െ ݈
݊ ቁ
ଵିఘ
൅ 1 െ ݈݊ ቇ
1 ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ݊ ൬
1 െ ߩ
1 ൅ ߪ
ߛ
ߜ ቀ
1 െ ݈
݊ ቁ
ିఘ
െ ߪ1 ൅ ߪ൰
. (20) 
The sign of (20) is ambiguous because the sign of the denominator of (20) is ambiguous. 
If σ ൌ 0, then we obtain ௗ௟ௗఙ ൏ 0. However, graphical analysis derives 
ௗ௟
ௗఙ ൏ 0 for any σ. 
Defining ܮఙ ൌ l  and ܴఙ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ ൬ ଵଵାఙ
ఊ
ఋ ቀ
ଵି௟
௡ ቁ
ଵିఘ െ ఙଵାఙ ሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ൅
ଵ
ଵା௥൰ , one 
finds that an increase in σ reduces leisure time and raises the labor supply by elderly 
people. 
 
[Insert Fig. 3 around here.] 
 
These results are intuitive. An increase in subsidies for elderly labor supply 
increases the opportunity cost of leisure. Then, the elderly people increase the labor 
supply. In addition, the tax burden for subsidy policy reduces the household lifetime 
income and leisure, as a normal good. The elderly people raise the labor supply. 
Thereby, the following proposition is established. 
 
Proposition 1 
An increase in subsidies for labor supplied by older people increases the labor supply 
of older people. 
 
Wage inequality at the steady state is derived by (13), as 
௪భ
௪మ ൌ
ఊ
ఋ ቀ
ଵି௟
௡ ቁ
ଵିఘ
. (21) 
As shown by (21), an increase in labor supply by elderly people raises wage 
inequality ௪భ௪మ. The wage rate of younger people ݓଵ increases in a relative sense. This 
result demonstrates that the labor supplies from younger people and older people are 
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mutually complementary. By virtue of an increase in labor supply by older people, the 
marginal labor productivity of younger people is raised. 
 
An aging society with fewer children 
Second, we examine how the existence of fewer children affects the labor supply by 
older people and intergenerational wage inequality. Concretely, we consider the 
decrease in the population growth rate. Considering (19), a decrease in the population 
growth rate makes the ܴఙ	curve above shift in the model without pension and subsidy 
τ ൌ ε ൌ σ ൌ 0 because we wish to examine the direct effect of elderly labor supply, as 
shown in Fig. 4. 
 
[Insert Fig. 4 around here.] 
 
As shown in Fig. 4, a decrease in population growth reduces the labor supplied by 
older people. Now, with total differentiation of (17), we can confirm the result using 
the following calculation: 
݈݀
݀݊ ൌ െ
ߛሺ1 െ ݈ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻሺ1 െ ߩሻ
ߜ݊ଶ ቀ
1 െ ߩ
݊ ቁ
ିఘ
1 ൅ ߛሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻሺ1 െ ߩሻߜ݊ ቀ
1 െ ߩ
݊ ቁ
ିఘ ൏ 0. (22) 
From total differentiation of (21) and (22), we obtain 
݀ ݓଵݓଶ
݀݊ ൌ
1
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ
݈݀
݀݊ ൏ 0, 
(23) 
because of ௗ௟ௗ௡ ൏ 0 : the relative lack of children raises wage inequality. Then, the 
following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 2 
A decrease in the population growth rate reduces the labor supplied by older people 
and has the effect of increasing intergenerational wage inequality. 
 
A decrease in the population growth rate means that the labor supplied by younger 
people is slight compared with the labor supplied by older people. Then, the marginal 
12 
 
productivity of older labor supply decreases. The wage rate decreases because of 
complementarity between the younger labor supply and older labor supply. A decrease 
in the wage rate of older people decreases the opportunity cost of having leisure. Then 
older people increase leisure time instead of decreasing labor time. 
 
Pension Policy 
Third, we examine how the pension policy affects the labor supply by the older people. 
Considering (17), the effect of an increase in pension contribution rate τ on the elderly 
labor supply is determined, depending on n െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ, as shown in Fig. 5. An increase 
in pension contribution rate ε increases leisure time and decreases the labor supply 
by older people, as shown in Fig. 6. 
 
[Insert Fig. 5 around here.] 
 
[Insert Fig. 6 around here.] 
We can confirm the effect of the contribution rate of pension on the leisure time with 
total differentiation of (17), too. 
݈݀
݀߬ ൌ
ߛሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ൫݊ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ൯
ߜ ቀ
1 െ ݈
݊ ቁ
ଵିఘ
1 െ ߝ ൅ ߛሺ1 െ ߩሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻߜ݊ ቀ
1 െ ݈
݊ ቁ
ିఘ
൬1 ൅ ݊ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ1 ൅ ݎ ߬൰
, (24) 
݈݀
݀ߝ ൌ
݈
1 െ ߝ ൅ ߛሺ1 െ ߩሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻߜ݊ ቀ
1 െ ݈
݊ ቁ
ିఘ
൬1 ൅ ݊ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ1 ൅ ݎ ߬൰
.	 (25) 
Then, the following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 3 
An increase in pension benefits with an increase in the contribution rate for older 
people decreases the labor supplied by older people. An increase in the contribution 
rate for younger people decreases the elderly labor supply if n ൐ 1 ൅ ݎ. 
 
An increase in pension benefit raises the household lifetime income if n ൐ 1 ൅ ݎ. 
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Then, an increase in income increases leisure time because leisure is a normal good. 
Moreover, an increase in the contribution rate reduces the disposable wage rate that a 
household can obtain, which reduces the opportunity cost of having leisure and leisure 
time increase. 
 
5. Welfare 
This section presents consideration of optimal subsidy policy for the elderly labor 
supply. We set a social welfare function to examine optimal policy. As an assumption 
by van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), we assume the following social welfare 
function, as 
ܹ ൌ෍ߟ௦ି௧ሺߙ݈݊ܿଵ௦ିଵ ൅ ߚ݈݊ܿଶ௦ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ݈݈݊௦ሻ
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
, ሺ0 ൏ ߟ ൏ 1ሻ, (26) 
where η denotes the discount factor for each generation’s utility. 
We consider resource constraints in each period. Considering the income per young 
person as ݕ௧ ൌ ௒೟௅೟, we obtain 
ݕ௧ ൌ ݇ఏ ቆߛ ൅ ߜ ൬1 െ ݈௧݊ ൰
ఘ
ቇ
ଵ
ఘ. (27) 
Then, the resource constraint in each period is derived as 
݇ఏ ቆߛ ൅ ߜ ൬1 െ ݈௧݊ ൰
ఘ
ቇ
ଵ
ఘ ൅ ሺ݊݀௧ାଵ െ ݀௧ሻ െ ݎ݀௧ ൌ ܿଵ௧ ൅ ܿଶ௧݊ ൅ ݊݇ െ ݇. (28) 
Therein, ݀௧ represents the debt for foreign countries. Considering (26) and (28), we 
set the Lagrange equation as shown below. 
ܮ ൌ෍ߟ௦ି௧ሺߙ݈݊ܿଵ௦ିଵ ൅ ߚ݈݊ܿଶ௦ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ݈݈݊௦ሻ
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
൅෍ߣ௦ ቌ݇ఏ ቆߛ ൅ ߜ ൬1 െ ݈௦݊ ൰
ఘ
ቇ
ଵ
ఘ ൅ ሺ݊݀௦ାଵ െ ݀௦ሻ െ ݎ݀௧ െ ܿଵ௦ െ ܿଶ௦݊ ቍ
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
. 
(29) 
Then, the following allocations are derived to solve the maximization problem. 
ܿଵ௧
ܿଶ௧ ൌ
ߙߟ
ߚ݊, (30) 
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ܿଵ௧ାଵ
ܿଵ௧ ൌ
ߟሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
݊ , (31) 
ܿଶ௧ାଵ
ܿଵ௧ ൌ
ߚሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
ߙ , (32) 
ܿଵ௧
݈௧ାଵ ൌ
ߙ
1 െ ߙ െ ߚ
1
1 ൅ ݎ
ݓଵ௧ାଵ
ߛሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൬
1 െ ݈௧ାଵ
݊ ൰
ఘିଵ
, (33) 
With (5) and (7), we obtain ௖భ೟௟೟శభ at the decentralized economy. Compared with (33) at 
the steady state, we obtain optimal subsidy rate σ as 
ߪ ൌ 1ሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ 1. (34) 
Then, the following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 4 
The subsidy for elderly labor supply should be provided to maximize social welfare. 
 
This model economy contains externality in the labor market. If the younger or older 
labor supply increases, then the marginal productivity of the older or younger labor 
supply rises. However, the household does not consider the externality effect. Therefore, 
a subsidy policy is needed. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our paper sets a model in which both younger people and older people supply labor. 
An examination is presented of whether the subsidy for the elderly labor supply 
facilitates the elderly labor supply or not. This subsidy raises the elderly labor supply 
and is expected to be provided for social welfare. 
In economically developed countries, an aging society with fewer children is 
processing. Then, the retirement age is postponed. A trend of working during the old 
period is expected to be necessary to obtain sufficient income to spend during the old 
period. In addition, the government can cut pension benefits if older people supply 
labor actively. This result solves an increase in the burden for social security costs. 
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Moreover, by virtue of an increase in elderly labor supply, the wage rate of younger 
people can be raised because the marginal productivity of younger labor increases with 
the elderly labor supply. 
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Fig. 1 Employment rate of older workers % of population aged 55–64 (Data: OECD 
Statistics). 
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Fig. 2 Leisure time at the steady state. 
R is given by the straight line at ρ ൌ 0. If ρ ് 0, then R is given by the curve. 
However, the decreasing function at l does not change. 
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Fig. 3 Leisure time and subsidy for elderly labor supply. 
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Fig. 4 Fewer children and leisure time. 
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Fig. 5 Increase in contribution rate τ. 
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Fig. 6 Increase in contribution rate ε. 
